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Testimony of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. 
Before the Social Security Subcommittee 
of the House Ways and Means Committee 
June 27, 2012 
 
 My name is Richard J. Pierce, Jr. I am Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at 
George Washington University. I have taught and written about administrative law for 35 
years. I have written over 20 books and over 120 articles on administrative law. The 
Supreme Court has relied on my books and articles in over a dozen opinions. One of the 
topics I have addressed in my teaching, research and writing is disability decision making 
by the Social Security Administration (SSA). My most recent writing on that subject is 
“What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?” 34 Regulation 34 
(2011).  
 There are two major problems with the social security disability decision making 
process. First, the SSA disability program has become increasingly and unsustainably 
generous. Over the past four decades, the proportion of the population that has been 
determined to be permanently disabled has doubled. The cost of the program has 
increased four-fold over the past two decades. During that period, the cost of disability 
benefit awards has increased from 10% of SSA’s total budget to 18% of its budget. The 
trust fund from which disability benefits are paid is projected to be exhausted in 2016, 
long before the projected dates for exhaustion of the Social Security or Medicare trust 
funds. 
 Second, there is a large disparity in the rates at which benefits are granted by the 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who have the final say in the SSA decision making 
process in the vast majority of cases. Thus, for instance, the SSA Office of Inspector 
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General found that, while the average grant rate for SSA’s 1400 ALJ’s was 67%, the 
range of grant rates was 8.6% to 99.7%. An applicant in San Juan has an 87.92% 
probability of obtaining a favorable decision from an SSA ALJ, while an applicant in 
Shreveport has only a 37.42% probability of getting a favorable decision from an SSA 
ALJ. In every case in which an ALJ grants benefits, a team consisting of a disability 
examiner and a medical advisor has determined that the applicant is not disabled. In most 
cases, two such teams have determined that the applicant is not disabled. 
 The root of these two problems is the inherent difficulty of the decision making 
process in the cases in which one or two examiner/medical advisor teams have 
determined that an applicant is not so disabled that he can not work and that decision is 
appealed to an ALJ. Most such cases involve claims that the applicant is unable to work 
because of one of two conditions—mental illness or chronic pain. These conditions are 
extremely common in the population that is potentially eligible for disability benefits. 
The National Institute of Medicine (NIM) has determined that 116,000,000 Americans 
suffer from chronic pain, while the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has 
determined that 61,000,000 Americans suffer from mental illness. The incidence of 
chronic pain is higher in the relatively older population that accounts for most disability 
applications than in the total population. Thus, over half of the relevant population suffers 
from one or both of the two health conditions that account for most of the ALJ decisions 
to reverse denials of benefits by disability examiner/medical advisor teams.        
Given the prevalence of mental illness and chronic pain in the population that is 
potentially eligible for disability benefits, it would make no sense to say that anyone who 
suffers from one of those conditions is eligible for permanent benefits without 
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considering the severity of the condition. Thus, the task for the decision maker is to 
determine whether the applicant suffers from mental illness or chronic pain so severe that 
he should be classified as permanently disabled. Determining the severity of an 
individual’s mental illness or chronic pain is extremely difficult. Chronic pain illustrates 
the problem. Pain is completely subjective. The same underlying physical condition can 
cause one person to suffer an unbearable level of chronic pain, while another person with 
the same physical source of pain experiences only minor and sporadic pain. 
In this difficult context, all that a decision maker can do is to attempt, however 
imperfectly, to determine the severity of an applicant’s pain or mental illness and to grant 
benefits only to applicants who fall on the severe end of the spectrum of the population of 
applicants. The large increase in the per cent of the population that has been determined 
to be disabled in recent years demonstrates that ALJs, on average, have granted benefits 
to many applicants with less severe mental illness or pain than ALJs considered sufficient 
to qualify for disability benefits in the recent past. That is the primary cause of the first 
problem I identified—an increasingly and unsustainably generous rate of granting 
disability benefits. The large variation in the grant rates of individual ALJs demonstrates 
that ALJs vary greatly in the place on the spectrum of severity of mental illness or 
chronic pain where each draws the eligibility line. Some ALJs grant benefits to applicants 
who suffer minor mental illness or pain, while other ALJs grant benefits only to 
applicants with severe mental illness or pain.  
The task of managing the SSA disability decision making process is greatly 
complicated by three factors—the decisional independence of SSA ALJs, the new role of 
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lawyers for disability applicants, and the attitude of the courts that review the ALJ 
decisions. I will discuss each in turn. 
The roughly 1400 SSA ALJs have complete decisional independence. By statute, 
their performance cannot be evaluated, and their decision making can not be subjected to 
any form of quality control. When SSA attempted to implement modest quality assurance 
programs in the past, ALJs enjoyed a great deal of success in persuading district courts to 
block SSA’s attempts to implement quality controls of any type. In a recent survey, SSA 
staff attributed the large disparity in ALJ grant rates primarily to ALJs’ decisional 
independence. By statute, SSA can not take any action against an ALJ without 
persuading another ALJ, who works at the Merit Systems Performance Board, that it has 
“good cause” to take some action against the ALJ. Without some major change in 
applicable law, it would be impossible for SSA to establish “good cause” to take any 
action against an ALJ based on the ALJ’s pattern of decisions. Thus an ALJ can, if he 
chooses, grant benefits in 100% of the cases that come before him without any concern 
that SSA will take any action against him. 
In my opinion, the institutional structure in which SSA ALJs can take final 
actions and can only be removed for cause by someone who, in turn, can only be 
removed for cause, violates both the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause of 
the Constitution. I recommend that Congress eliminate the role of ALJs in the disability 
decision making process. The ability to appeal a denial of benefits by two disability 
examiner/medical advisor teams to an ALJ introduces far more errors in decision making 
than it eliminates.  At a minimum, Congress should amend the statute that limits SSA’s 
ability to act against ALJs by making it clear that SSA has the power to evaluate the 
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performance of ALJs and to take such actions as SSA considers necessary to insure that 
ALJs are not unduly generous in their grant rates and do not grant or deny benefits at a 
rate that diverges significantly from the rate at which most SSA ALJs grant or deny 
benefits. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the SSA disability decision making process 
is designed to be implemented by SSA without any involvement of lawyers or other 
professional advocates either for applicants or for the government. Today, however, over 
80% of applicants are represented by lawyers or other professional advocates, while the 
government is never represented. This systemic imbalance between applicants and the 
government undoubtedly has contributed to the increase in the rate at which ALJs grant 
benefits. Lawyers and other professional advocates for disability applicants have devised 
systems for maximizing the probability of a decision granting benefits to their clients by 
soliciting and emphasizing medical evidence favorable to their clients while withholding 
medical evidence that is unfavorable to their clients. The government is helpless to stop 
these abusive practices, since the ALJ has a statutory duty to help the applicant develop 
the record and the government is not represented. This gaming of the system by lawyers 
and other professional advocates has become extremely lucrative. One firm made 
$81,000,000 in a single year representing disability applicants. When the role of lawyers 
and other professional advocates is combined with the statutorily-based rule that allows 
an applicant to supplement his application and the evidence in support of his application 
with additional claims and evidence at any time, the results are awful, measured by any 
criteria. Lawyers and other professional advocates regularly sand bag SSA and its ALJs 
by declining to present important evidence until late in a proceeding. 
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I recommend that Congress limit the fees that can be earned by lawyers and other 
professional advocates for SSA disability advocates. The Supreme Court has upheld a fee 
limit of $10 for advocates for VA disability benefits, so Congress has broad discretion to 
limit the fees of advocates for SSA disability benefits. I also recommend that Congress 
amend the Social Security Act to empower SSA to issue rules that govern the time when 
claims can be made and evidence can be submitted in support of an application for SSA 
disability benefits. Virtually all other federal agency decision making processes have 
rules that require parties to submit all of their claims and all of the evidence in support of 
their claims no later than a point relatively early in the decision making process.   
Federal courts are required by statute to engage in deferential review of SSA 
disability decisions, but courts routinely ignore that statutory command. Courts are 
required by statute to uphold SSA findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. The Supreme Court has characterized the substantial evidence test as highly 
deferential. In the Supreme Court’s words, a court must uphold any agency finding that is 
supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”       
Paul Verkuil, a well-respected scholar who is now Chairman of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, published the results of his careful 
empirical study of judicial review of social security disability decisions in “An Outcomes 
Analysis of Scope of Review Standards,” 44 William & Mary Law Review 679 (2002). 
Verkuil’s findings were surprising. He expected to find that courts applying the 
deferential substantial evidence standard would uphold 75-85% of SSA decisions 
denying benefits. He also expected the rate of affirmance of decisions denying disability 
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benefits to be higher than the rate of affirmance of a class of agency decisions that are 
subject to de novo review. His findings were inconsistent with both of those expectations. 
He found that courts uphold less than 50% of decisions that deny social security disability 
benefits and that courts reverse a much higher proportion of disability decisions than of 
agency decisions that are subject to de novo judicial review. Verkuil expressed doubt that 
“Congress wants judicial scope of review to be an irrelevant labeling exercise,” but his 
findings demonstrate that it is “an irrelevant labeling exercise” in the context of judicial 
review of social security disability decisions. District courts and circuit courts routinely 
pay lip service to the deferential substantial evidence standard while actually applying a 
standard more demanding even than de novo review. 
A sequence of events that took place between 1978 and 2003 illustrates the 
extreme tendency of district courts and circuit courts to refuse to apply the substantial 
evidence standard and to apply instead a much more demanding standard of their own 
choosing. Beginning in 1978 and extending through the 1980s, several circuit courts 
adopted the “treating physician rule,” a rule that required SSA to make a decision 
consistent with the opinion of a physician who treats a disability applicant unless SSA 
can amass a great deal of evidence that contradicts that opinion. The treating physician 
rule was obviously inconsistent with the deferential substantial evidence test, but that 
blatant inconsistency had no apparent effect on the courts. After over a decade of 
unsuccessful attempts to persuade the courts to accord it the deference that Congress 
required, SSA capitulated and issued a rule in which it codified the treating physician rule 
and instructed its ALJs to apply the rule. 
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After successfully persuading the courts to defy Congress and to force SSA to 
adopt the treating physician rule, disability advocates embarked on efforts to require 
other agencies with responsibility to implement other disability programs to adopt the 
treating physician rule. They enjoyed initial success in that effort when they persuaded 
the Ninth Circuit to require the Department of Labor to adopt the treating physician rule 
in the context of the disability programs it implements under ERISA. The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “there is no reason why the treating physician rule should not be used 
under ERISA .  .  .  .” The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit in 
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003). Justice Ginsburg 
explained: 
The question whether a treating physician rule would “increase the accuracy of 
disability determinations” under ERISA plans, as the Ninth Circuit believed it 
would  .  .  .  seems to us one the Legislature or superintending administrative 
agency is best positioned to address. As compared to consultants retained by a 
plan, it may be true that treating physicians, as a rule, “have greater opportunity to 
know and observe the patient as an individual.” Nor do we question the Court of 
Appeals’ concern that physicians repeatedly retained by benefits plans may have 
an “incentive to make a finding of ‘not disabled’ in order to save their employers 
money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements.” But the assumption 
that the opinions of a treating physician warrant greater credit than the opinions of 
plan consultants may make scant sense when, for example, the relationship 
between the claimant and the treating physician has been of short duration, or 
when a specialist engaged by a plan has expertise the treating physician lacks. 
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And if a consultant engaged by a plan has an “incentive” to make a finding of 
“not disabled,” so a treating physician, in a close case, may favor a finding of 
“disabled.” Intelligent resolution of the question whether routine deference to the 
opinion of a claimant’s treating physician would yield more accurate disability 
determinations, it thus appears, might be aided by empirical investigation of the 
kind courts are ill equipped to perform. 
 
  An experienced SSA ALJ explained to me the effects that lawless judicial 
decisions like those that require SSA to apply the treating physician rule have on the 
behavior of SSA ALJs. Congress and the Social Security Commissioner impose a great 
deal of entirely appropriate pressure on SSA’s ALJs to decide a large number of 
disability cases promptly. ALJs know that they can write a brief opinion explaining a 
decision to grant benefits with little risk of reversal. Courts can not review decisions that 
grant benefits, and the Social Security Appeals Council reviews only a tiny proportion of 
ALJ decisions to grant benefits. By contrast, ALJs know that they must write an 
extremely long and detailed opinion explaining a decision to deny benefits to have any 
chance of surviving judicial review.  
The incentive effects of such an unbalanced system of judicial review are 
obvious. My academic colleagues understand the bizarre incentive effects immediately 
when I analogize to a grading system in which a school gives a professor complete 
discretion to choose the grade he awards each student but couples that unlimited 
discretion with a rule that requires the professor to write a three page explanation for 
every A he awards and a twenty page explanation for every grade he awards that is less 
 10 
than A. Such a bizarre asymmetric set of grading rules would produce a pattern of grades 
in which the vast majority of students receive an A. ALJs respond to the asymmetric 
system of review of disability benefit decisions in a similar manner.     
 It is hard to identify a promising means of persuading reviewing courts to apply 
the deferential scope of review standard Congress requires them to apply to SSA 
disability decisions. Congress always has the option of amending the Social Security Act 
to preclude all judicial review of SSA decisions in disability cases except the exceedingly 
rare case in which an applicant makes a plausible claim that the denial violates his 
constitutional rights. If the courts persist in their pattern of lawless behavior in this 
context, Congress will have no choice but to take that step.  
I recommend an alternative approach initially, however. Congress should 
encourage SSA to take two actions. First, SSA should rescind the treating physician rule. 
That would be a major step in the right direction. Second, SSA should choose one of the 
many circuit court opinions that exhibit judicial defiance of the congressional command 
to engage in deferential review of disability decisions as the basis for filing a petition for 
writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. As the Court’s unanimous opinion in Black 
and Decker illustrates, the Supreme Court is far more respectful of congressional 
commands to engage in deferential review of SSA disability determinations than are most 
district courts and circuit courts. It makes sense to provide the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to do its job of keeping the lower courts within statutory bounds before 
Congress gives up completely on the ability and willingness of the judicial branch to 
perform its review function in a manner consistent with law. 
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Thank you for the opportunity to share my views on this important topic. I would 
be pleased to answer any questions you may have.                                                                        
